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FINAL REPORT
of
TICOM TEAM 3
on exploitation
of
BURGSCHIEDUNGEN

TICOM
3 June 1945

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
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FINAL REPORT TICOM TEAM UNDER LT. COL. EVANS AND LT. COL. NEFF.

(TEAM 3)

INTRODUCTION

This report is divided into the following sections:

- 1) General History; 2) Administrative History; 3) Exploitation of Subsidiary Targets; 4) Interrogation Report; 5) Documents Report; 6) Report on Hollerith Equipment; 7) Report on Security Measures; 8) Summary and Statement of Unfinished Business.

1) General History.

The main target at BURGSCHEIDUNGEN (BURG for purposes of this report) was passed by the American line of advance about 13 April. The village is a small one, and there was no fighting in it. Except for possible scattered parties moving through the village, the first American Army man to visit the village and the Burg itself was 2d Lt. Alfred G. FENN, Military Government, Kreis Querfurt, Provincial Detachment No. 14, First U.S. Army. Lt. FENN visited the Burg about 18 April and interviewed the owner, Graf von der SCHULENBERG, using Fraulein FRIEDRICHS of the Foreign Office group as interpreter. Lt. FENN learned on this visit that there was a section of the Foreign Office at the Burg, but Fraulein FRIEDRICHS was evasive about it, and the point was not pressed. Lt. FENN had no forces at that time to occupy or guard. He however, was sufficiently impressed to return for further information about three days later, and on this second visit Fraulein FRIEDRICHS and ROHRBACH requested a private talk with him. In this talk they informed him that they were the cryptographic section of the Foreign Office and that they were prepared to discuss their work with appropriate persons. Lt. FENN handled them gently at first and extracted the whole outline of their work from them. At the end he warned them that now that the existence of the unit and its files was known, any destruction of files would be punished by death.

Lt. FENN put his findings into a report to his superiors, G-5, V Corps, and his report was passed to Col. CLEAVES, Signal Officer, V Corps. Col. CLEAVES visited the Burg himself and covered about the same ground with Fraulcin FRIEDRICHS and ROHRBACH. On 24 April he communicated by telephone with Director, SID, ETOUSA and at about the same time a guard of the 102nd Cavalry Regiment was posted at the Burg with the principal aim not of restricting the persons within but of preventing the target from being disturbed by friendly forces or liberated slave workers.

On receipt of this telephone call Director, SID, ETOUSA, while notifying war station immediately named a team of personnel then available at Paris, headed by Lt. Col. Paul E. NEFF, SID, ETOUSA, and Lt. Col. Geoffrey EVANS, Intelligence Corps, British Army. (Full lists of personnel in Appendix A.) This team left Paris on 25 April and went by car via Verdun, Wiesbaden, Weimar, and Naumburg (successive HQ'S) to the target, arriving on the morning of 27 April.

The team found the target apparently intact, and the personnel all present. (Full lists of German personnel in Appendix B.) Lt. Col. Evans promptly began interrogation of key personnel, while other members of the team began the examination of documents and conducted interrogation of minor personnel. At the same time arrangements were completed for quartering the team in the ample space available at the Burg.

From the first the members of the team tended to undertake specialties and to assume responsibilities in particular fields. Lt. Col. NEFF handled signals and major matters of policy, which involved a daily 35-mile run to First Army Headquarters at Weimar. Lt. Col. Evans handled interrogations and marshalled the facts arising therefrom for appropriate action. Major BUNDY was primarily concerned with records of the party, with documents in conjunction with Sgt. LORAM, and with security measures. Capt. MACINTYRE was responsible for vehicles and rations, and both he and Capt. ADAMS had a large share in field trips to additional targets. Sgt. MARX specialized in dealing with the Germans of the Burg and the village, and also participated in field trips and in matters calling for his excellent command of the language, the last being true of Sgt. LORAM as well. And last but not least Cpl. SCHNABEL, whose knowledge of Allied systems did not apply to the target, made himself invaluable as the indefatigable cook for the team.

On 28 April Lt. Col. NEFF and Capt. ADAMS, by dint of smart detective work and a brisk car chase, located and took custody of PASCHKE and KUNZE, actually removing them physically from the truck in which they were headed for the First Army POW cage. The original arrest of these men had taken place at Zschepplin about 26 April, and was a tribute to the prompt work of Col. CLEAVES, who had learned of their importance in his conversations at the Burg. The men were brought directly to the Burg and interrogated by Lt. Col. EVANS. 11

On the same day Lt. Col. EVANS completed his interrogation of the Burg party, with particular reference to additional targets of OKW and the Military services. Further work on the documents was done, and in the evening OSLU was drafted, reporting progress and emphasizing the desirability of air evacuation.

The following day, 29 April, was spent in work on the documents, a visit to Halle/Nietleben, and efforts to arrange transportation for the material and personnel to be evacuated. This first visit to Halle/Nietleben was fruitless, but the transportation efforts began to bear immediate fruit in the shape of a command car, and with the supplements that arrived in later days from various U.S. Radio Intelligence companies the work of the team was not hampered hereafter for lack of this.

Except for documents and a full interrogation of PASCHKE and KUNZE, 30 April was also spent largely in contacts and admin. The contacts, with VII Corps, were essential as this Corps controlled the area of Zschepplin and very shortly after this assumed from V Corps the control of the Burg area itself.

On Tuesday, 1 May, while Lt. Col. NEFF wrestled with the problems of air evacuation as by then planned for Thursday, Lt. Col. EVANS and Capt. ADAMS made the first trip to Zschepplin. They spent the entire day there and gathered all the facts of the situation. BRANDES, GRUNSKY, and ZASTROW were taken into custody and brought to the Burg, and the trailer of Hollerith machinery was located and a guard arranged by the co-operation of the 104th Infantry Division.

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Wednesday, 2 May, was marked by the initial visit to Muehlhausen of Capt. ADAMS, who brought yet another captive back with him in the person of ROY. It was quickly realized that he was not quite in the same boat with the others, and he was segregated from the first. Otherwise the day was notable for the arrival of Lt. STRIBLING with the heavy transportation which handled the team's main requirements from that point on.

The next two days were heartbreaking for all members of the team. Arrangements for air evacuation had been completed, Major CADDICK had duly arrived on Wednesday night to act as chief courier, and the material and documents were duly brought to points at and near the field at the proper time. The only hitch was that, because of real or fancied misgivings about the weather, the planes did not leave Paris on either day, and those responsible for them took no steps to notify the team of their non-departure. In order that they should not know that they were to travel by air the personnel were taken only to the outskirts of Kolleda, and it is unlikely that the field ration picnics by the roadside will be soon forgotten by Capt. MacINTYRE, who on successive days bore the burden of escort while the rest of the team waited helpless and frustrated at the airfield. It was therefore with some relief that Saturday morning brought word that the flight was postponed until Monday because of continuing bad weather.

The interval was used for successive visits to Zschepplin on Saturday and Sunday, the 5th and 6th. On the first day admin matters were cleared for the arrest by Counter Intelligence authorities of all the remaining operational personnel, plus the wives of some of those already held. The return trip accordingly found a bag of some forty civilians being held, and seven of these were brought to the Burg on the night of the 6th to be evacuated by air. Some documents and material were also brought, though the bulk had been destroyed. The two days had been used meanwhile to make a security ^{check} of the whole of the Burg, and to winnow from the remaining non-operational documentary material any items of incidental intelligence. Plans were also made for security measures against the Russians, and in particular Lt. Col. NEFF succeeded in arranging for the evacuation to Marburg in the eventual American area of all possible civilians with whom the team had been in contact.

The air evacuation finally came off on Monday, the 7th, at 1500. 11

In fact the delay, while extremely trying and potentially dangerous to the smooth co-operation of the Germans, had the good effect of allowing all important personnel to be sent at once rather than by a later trip. In any case the oft-rehearsed routing did not fail, and the departure of the planes carried with it the end of the major intelligence-gathering work of the team.

There remained the Hollerith machinery at Zschepplin, and possible material at Halle/Nietleben, Muehlhausen, and Arnstadt to investigate, and a major logistical problem to solve in the transportation of more than 50 persons and over 200 file cases out of sight of the Russians.

The Hollerith was disposed of on VE day, 8 May. Major Adams, who had arrived from Paris the preceding day, examined it thoroughly and extracted key parts. The remainder was left in the trailer and the whole towed to a vacant field and demolished beyond recognition by the efforts of the pioneer infantry of the 104th Division. As if these fireworks were not enough in celebration, the entire party ended that evening by drinking the local wine from the Graf's tablecloths in the Festsaal of the Burg, with appropriate toasts and additional fireworks with materials available.

On Wednesday the 9th the first convoy of Delitzsch civilians was despatched to Marburg, and Lt. Col. EVANS and Major BUNDY investigated the Halle/Nietleben target with largely negative results. Thursday, while the convoy was returning to reload, Lt. Col. EVANS and Capt. ADAMS investigated Muehlhausen, while Capt. MACINTYRE tried and failed to find anything at Arnstadt. And on Friday the Burg civilians were taken to Marburg, the guard was relieved, and the exploitation completed except for checking and reporting to various headquarters as the team returned to Paris. Major BUNDY, with a last truckload of material, arrived there on 13 May, while the remainder of the team arrived on the evening of the 14th.

3) Subsidiary Targets.

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a) MUEHLHAUSEN

This target was visited by Lt. Col. EVANS and Capt. ADAMS on Thursday, May 10. The first action taken was that of depositing Dr. ROY (see interrogation report) at his house, having first obtained from him a complete list of all Pers Z Gen and Pers Z S people who had come to MUEHLHAUSEN from Zschoppelin(Doc K). At the same time I told him to get hold of Dr.GERLACH, who seemed to be the most important of those left. He proved however to have played only a quite minor part in the organisation and I let hi^m go.

The four locations given us for Pers Z Gen and S material were:

- Amtsgerichtsgebäude
- Deutschritterschule
- Fritz Sauckelschule
- Railway sidings (trucks).

The first of these was the only one which yielded any fruit, and very little at that. There were four green safes of the regular Pers Z type - empty. (Instructions left with C-in-C to dispose of these). Also a certain amount of stationery and a few addressed envelopes. But nothing else.

The Deutschritterschule, given as a location by Dr.GERLACH, was found to have been used by other sections of the AUSWAERTIGES AMT evacuated to M. And a mission from G.2 Shaef, under Lt.Col. SPENCER (Brit) and Major WEISSENBERGE(US) had put all rooms under lock and key. We managed however to find the appropriate keys and obtained access. The documents, which were very numerous, were all of the Ausw. Amt but none of Pers Z or Z.S. We therefore locked up again and went to the Sauckelschule. Here there were two rooms with Shaef notices on and for one of these the key could not be found. However the other was material of no Sig. Int. importance, and I think it unlikely therefore that Pers Z. S. material will be found. If it is, the office channels should bring it to us in due course.

- 7 -

Finally the railway yards were filled with some 3 or 400 waggons, many looked
It was a task quite beyond our time or means to go through these, for material
which might or might not be there. We spent nearly an hour on three train
loads and found chiefly machinery and G.I. clothes. As all statements have
agreed that in any case only personal effects were in these waggons, I think
this chase can safely be abandoned.

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b). Halle/Nietleben. Heeres- und Luftnachrichtenschule.

Two CHI Sections were evacuated into these buildings.

a). A party of Pers Z. S. who subsequently moved on to Zschoppelin.

b). A party from OKW/CHI from Berlin. These numbered some 20 people
and the senior man was Obltn ADL'R. They worked in Baracke 10 H
and Stabsgebaeude 80.

These two buildings were found to be opposite each other and occupied
respectively by a supply company and a group of American ex Prisoners of War.
Prior to this occupation the buildings had already housed elements of the
infantry who first freed the area. The chances of finding anything were there-
fore extremely slender, and though it was impossible to go through Stabsge-
baeude 80 room by room, it can be taken that nothing of interest remains there.
All that was discovered was a pile of "Secret" stationery belonging to OKW CHI
(samples herewith). This was in a cupboard in the basement and was removed in
toto. A list of the names of the people known to have been here was left
with C-inC. 7th Corps and they have undertaken to pick these people up for us.

It is worth mentioning that the Heeres u. Luftnachrichtenschule is a vast
complex of buildings, many of which are stacked high with electrical apparatus
of every sort. We brought away a few papers from one room to indicate the kind
of thing that is to be found. If the appropriate authorities are not already
aware of this target, action should be taken fairly soon, as hundreds of ex P of
W drift around all the time and take what they like.

c). Bad Berka. ARNSTADT.

Information had been given that there might be trucks of Pers Z. S. material in the Railway yards at these two places. An exhaustive search was carried out by Capt. MacINTYRE and nothing found.

4). INTERROGATION REPORT

Interrogation throughout was conducted in German and had as its sole object the eliciting of information about the location and scope of further targets, and the names and likely whereabouts of individuals concerned with them. Out of it arose:

- a) A fair number of new targets of varying size.
- b) A large list of names.
- c) A general picture of the organization both of "Pers Z.S" and of other kindred organizations.

This report falls into two parts. (1) An account of the form the interrogations took and the occasions on which they were carried out. (2) The information derived under the three headings listed above.

I.

April 27

On arrival at HQ V Corps, U.S. Army we contacted Col. Cleaves, Signal Officer of the Corps, upon whose initiative the target had been held and "frozen" pending our arrival. We proceeded at once to Burg S. and were met at the head of the stairs by the senior members of the German party. Col. Cleaves introduced us in English using as intermediary Frl. FRIEDRICHS, a fluent English speaker.

The senior members were:

ORR SCHAUFFLER - Head of line section

Prof. Dr. ROHRBACH

Dr. KARSTIEN

Frl. FRIEDRICHS

They handed us a list of those present in the castle and expressed their desire to give an account of their work and organization. We sat down at once therefore round a long table, and Dr. SCHAUFFLER, prompted by the others, outlined the organization of "PERS Z. S" that is, the Cypher-breaking section of the Foreign Office.

The facts given at this session were later drawn up on paper and presented to me by Dr. SCHAUFFLER (Doc A).

In the course of the rest of the afternoon I interviewed the leading members of the party separately. Besides those listed above these included:

Dr. OLBRIGHT

Dr. MUELLER

Hr. GROSSE

HIERER

RAVE

SCHROEDER

Frl. SCHRADER

All were entirely co-operative in giving information on their own work but seemed remarkably ignorant of the work of associated sections - OKH, OKL, OKM, etc. I formed the opinion that they had had a conference prior to our arrival and had decided that they would tell all they knew on their own field but would hold back on anything to do with Wehrmacht.

April 28

Acting on the assumption that the German party were holding back on their knowledge of kindred organizations I called Frl. FRIEDRICHS and explained to her that their account of their own organization was excellent, but that I was astonished at the lack of liaison between them and their colleagues in associated departments, and would like a fuller account of this. I told her to put this point to their senior members and come back to see me in a few moments. She returned very shortly after with Dr. ROHRBACH and the gist of what they said was this:

II

The lack of liaison was indeed remarkable and to them had always been a matter of regret and vexation. But the fact was they they kept strictly to themselves, as did also each kindred department, partly for security reasons, partly from interdepartmental jealousy. Dr. ROHRBACH then assured me that they were perfectly willing to try and get together a concerted picture together of the sum total of their knowledge in the respect demanded, and asked me if I would agree to having a round table talk after lunch, instead of questioning them individually. I agreed to do this.

At this conference, which lasted most of the afternoon, were present: SCHAUFFLER, ROHRBACH, KARSTIEN, FRIEDRICHS, GROSSE, HIERER, RAVE, SCHROEDER. The four latter were brought in as having worked into OKW/CHI. From this conference a great deal of extra information was forthcoming about OKW/CHI, and a certain amount on other CHI organizations. (See Part II of this report).

My view at the time as to the attitude of the German party was that originally there was an intention to stick to Foreign Office matters, but that this was abandoned as soon as they saw that they were going to be pressed to go beyond the point.

In the evening about 7 o'clock Col. Neff arrived with Drs. PASCHKE and KUNZE whom he had managed to trace after a good many vicissitudes and adventures. I at once interviewed these two and found them quite ready to help, though extremely tired after a day of travel. I left them for later interview but asked them to let me have by the morning a list of all personnel serving or having served under them with locations as far as possible. This was handed to me the next day (Doc C).

11

April 30

The morning was taken up with an interview of Dr. PASCHKE and KUNZE. They were completely co-operative and added a great many personalities to the list of those already secured, at the same time clarifying the organization of the whole. There is no doubt in my mind that PASCHKE is the most effective member of the whole party, while SCHAUFFLER, who is on the same level of seniority, is more the "absent-minded professor". This view was confirmed later in the afternoon of this day when Dr. ROHRBACH (who has throughout been the "Wortführer") came to ask if he could borrow back the original table of organization drawn up by SCHAUFFLER (Doc A) in order to emend and amplify it under Dr. PASCHKE's guidance. This they did and the result is Doc B. The difference between the two is to be understood as the difference between the full peace-time set-up of the office (B) and the emergency set-up resulting from the vicissitudes of war (A).

On the evening of the 4th May I was approached by one of the subordinate office workers, Frau SCHADEWALDT, who claimed that Dr. PASCHKE was exerting his influence against co-operation with us; she alleged also that he had reproached Dr. ROHRBACH with his failure to destroy their documents and finally that he had been in with the Party and possibly a member. Acting on the assumption that this information was substantially true we put PASCHKE under separate detention, in which he remained until his time to set out for the airfield. On the evening of Saturday, May 5th, I had an hour's talk with him, in which, without mentioning Frau SCHADEWALDT or any specific source, I suggested that his attitude was less co-operative than that of the others and left something to be desired. He denied firmly that he had in fact brought any pressure to bear on the others in the direction suggested, and gave the following account of his position:

he had the choice, when captured, of two courses - either to maintain complete silence or to accept the inevitable consequences of Germany's defeat and to adopt the attitude which is accepted in such circumstances as honourable and which is characterised as "Loyalität". This word corresponds in meaning to "loyalty" only in so far as it implies the faithful carrying out of conditions imposed by force majeure, and it indicates the same kind of attitude as that of the prisoner of war who gives 'Parole', but covers a wider sphere of action.

Information from interrogation of Dr. ROY, May 7.

Abtlg Pers Z was formerly Abtlg I (Eins) of the Foreign Office, i.e. the normal Admin Section. Acquiring work of Pers Z.S. type it changed its name, giving cipher work the general cover of a "Personell" Dept. It is divided thus:

GESANDTER			
SELCHOW			
:			
:			
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Pers Z.S. <i>interdict</i> ORR PASCHKE SCHAUFFLER	Pers Z.F. <i>comp. section</i> ORR HOFFMAN	Pers Z. CHI. <i>officer</i> ORR HAUTHAL	Pers Z.GEN. <i>general</i> DR. ROY

- (2) Concerned with all questions of communications-telephone, T.P. etc.
- (3) Concerned with production of Foreign Office own cyphers.
- (4) Concerned with Personnel and Admin problems for the whole.

General Observations:

The question that naturally suggests itself is: Why did these prisoners all talk so freely? The answer is partly to be found in the course of events leading to the discovery of the whole party. (See first page of the General History of Events). And might be summed up as follows:

- (1) Desire to be considered as scientists, having a pride in their work, and prepared to share results with other scientists in the same field, as is done in medicine, etc. This viewpoint was strongly put by ROHRBACH.
- (2) "Germany is no more. One cannot harm what does not exist". These were SCHAUFFLER's opening words at our first session. They indicate the lines on which the members have cleared their consciences in regard to breaking the oath of secrecy.
- (3) Fear of the Russians.
- (4) Desire to improve their present position, get in well with us, retrieve something out of the disaster.

My approach to the prisoners has been friendly throughout - with a short break when insisting on more information about OKW - and I think more can be gained by maintaining this attitude than by adopting a formal or threatening one. I would suggest that ORR SCHERSCHMIDT, who is at present somewhere in regular PW channels, be kept separate from the others until all are together where microphone apparatus is available, and that then full use be made of this.

II

II

A) NEW TARGETS (including Ticom Targets already known)

1) Pers Z.S. (Auswärtiges Amt)

These have all been cleared up now with such exceptions as are noted in the Reports.

2) O K W

This SigInt organisation, originally situated in the Haus am Runden Platz, Potsdamerstrasse (no mention of Wilmersdorf) had up to 400 people, and was largely concerned with diplomatic material. In spite of this, liaison with Pers Z.S. seems to have been very slight. The bulk of the information supplied is available owing to the fact that a) Paschke is a senior enough official to know something of other organisations b) there were 4 members of OKW on attachment to Pers Z.S. at the time of capture. Besides the main offices there was an office in the Margarethenstrasse near the Potsdamerstrasse, and a house out at GRUENEWALD.

Targets from this complex are:

1. A party under Obltn ADLER, which evacuated to the Heeres nachrichtenschule NIETLEBEN near HALLE (See Doc G). See Section 3 of this report.
2. There was talk of CHIEMSEE as location for a main move. This would probably imply the Fraueninsel, an island in the middle of the lake with a large monastery on it.
3. Other reports mention TRAUNSTEIN; but evidence here is very vague.
4. It is possible that Dr. HÜTTENHAIN, machine specialist for OKW, and his party were with ADLER at NIETLEBEN, (See Doc G)

3) O K M

- went to Panzergrenadierkaserne EBERSWALDE (confirmation of Ticom location). Names of senior cryptographers were: Oberregat FRANKE and DR. TRANOW.

4) O K L

1) POTSDAM location confirmed.

Specialist for American/English given as: Regierungsrat VÖGELER

His department thought to be about 30 strong. Also in the dept.:

Herr VOERMANN (cousin or nephew of the Ambassador).

2) The existence of a rival SigInt Luftfahrtministerium organisation, under GÖRING's control, is stated. It has the title FORSCHUNGSAMT and was situated in CHARLOTTENBURG. For names and general set-up see Main Section C of this Report. KAUFBEUREN is mentioned as a possible present location.

5) O K H

JÜTERBOG location confirmed. Only very few names known, as follows:

BELOWITZ, KOCHENDORFER, STEINBERG, (later under Hütterhain at

Okw), METTIG (admin. Officer, later to Okw)

Insp KÜHN (only a recruitment officer)

6. Gesandter SELCHOW

- head of the whole organisation, since 1919, last known to be in SALZBURG, sent instructions on the Friday after Easter mentioning move to BREGENZ. A waggon of his personal effects was found in the Courtyard of the Castle of Zschepplin. These were looked through carefully and no papers found.

7. Y-Stations

In charge: Oberstltm KÄHLER

The following were given:

CHI 111B BERLIN: formerly in charge of Prof. Dr. PONSCHAB.

TREUENBRIETZEN - west of JÜTERBOG

LAUF - near NÜRNBERG

DAHLEM - known as "Landhaus D", only few sets.

LÖRRACH - in Baden

Under Forschungsamt:

B - Breslau, Leba, Lübben, Templin

Also external stations at Madrid and Plovidiv.

c)

1. Outline of Organisation of Pers Z.S.


The best picture of this, together with names of personalities is given in Doc B. Compare also with Doc A, which is, however, not accurate.

2. Outline of FORSCHUNGSAMT Organisation

This organisation which was controlled by GÖRING and came under Luftfahrtministerium was at first in the Schillerstrasse Berlin/Charlottenburg; then moved to Breslau; where they were in the Hartlieb Barracks; then to Jüterbog; finally southwards. The suggested ultimate location is KAUFBEUREN, but this is by no means certain.

Head

Min Rat SCHRÖDER



11.

3. Outline of O K W Organisation

This organisation, which was situated in the Potsdamerstrasse and was 300-400 strong, is thought to have moved South to the CHIEMSEE.

Titular Head
 Oberstlin HÖPFNER


(He succeeded very recently to the former head; Oberst KETTLER. All knew the latter, none are very certain of the name HÖPFNER. but think that is the accurate form). Previous head to KETTLER was Oberst KEMPF)

Secretary to Head

FRL KUHNERT

Active Head

Min Rat ~~FENNER~~



I 1

Table (A)

English/U.S.A.	ORR ROHEN	Dr. WEISSE, RR SCHULZ, RR DENKER joined later by a Dr. Petersen
	Size 40-50	
French	ORR HELMUT MÜLLER	Obltn KUNZE M. later in Halle Herr GEHLING
	Size 20.	
Bulgarian	Min Rat ROTTER	
	very small	
Jugo-Slavia	Min Dir WENDLAND	
	small	
Roumanian	Major LENSCHAU	
	6	
Spanish	RR Dr. KIEFER	
	small	
Turkish	RR LOCKER	Deputy WITTE
	10	also GEMPERLE
Scandinavian	RR WEVERING	
	6	
Italian	ORR RAFFEL	
	35-40	
China	Obltn ADLER - (Schroten)	
Japan	"largish group"	
Poland	WHA BERNDT	
Greek	Min Rat SEIFFERT	
Switzerland	Hr. JUNG-FISCHER	

also active on more or less independent footing:

Dr. POSTGEN, BRUCKMANN, RÜSING Griechisch.

Table (B)

Bau Rat ROTSCHEID	had job of constructing machines. Under him a group of technicians (soldiers)
Prof Dr. FRANZ	mathematician. Head section of 15-20 functioned fairly independently went on to HALLE
Prof Dr. WEBER	Specialised in Polish
Prof Dr. AUERMANN	Mathematician
" " WITT	"
	} Colleagues of ROHRBACH
Oberstltn PASSOW	in charge of supply, servicing etc. of Hollerith.
Obltn STEIN	Agents messages. Links with OKH
Obltn VAUCK	worked on French agents' traffic section of 50
Ob Insp. MENZER	worked mostly on his own. Construction of German machines and processes. Constructed machine for Japan (?) Head 4-5 men

5). REPORT ON DOCUMENTS FOUND AT BURGSCHEIDUNGEN.

INTRODUCTORY ---- the handling of documents at this target has been affected to some extent by the unusual factors present in the general target situation. The target was taken intact, and the personnel still in it had not used the complete opportunity they had had to destroy all papers. Thus, although the personnel continued to be in the same building, the exploitation was as if they had been removed and was leisurely rather than hasty. The co-operation of files and giving details of the contents for the inventory. (Personnel were not permitted to go through any documents in this procedure.). In view of this attitude the files were not impounded immediately, but some were left in the work rooms for the first two days. The great bulk were from the first in the locked cellar and were moved from there directly to a guarded room, so that their security was complete.

The total material on hand comes under three heads:

- a). Steel file cases, about 4 and one half cu ft. There were altogether about 170 of these, of which all but 20 ~~XIX~~ were in the locked cellar.
- b). Crates of work material. There were five of these in the locked cellar.
- c). Personal luggage. There was a very large quantity of personal luggage, both in the cellar and in the rooms of the Burg.

The German personnel have assured us that all this luggage is in fact personal, and it has not been ransacked for official papers. Had concealment been desired it appears certain that a better method would have been found.

Similarly we have accepted the word of the German personnel that the material turned over to us is in fact the whole of the working material at the Burg. To have accepted otherwise would have been to undertake a systematic search of an enormous building with great facilities to hide material, and of the surrounding grounds. In addition to the basic fact that the personnel had at least a week

before the Burg was guarded effectively, there has been at least one other manifestation of their good faith in the turning over of an overlooked file containing moderately important material and of moderately important work notes left lying on a table and also overlooked.

Procedure The documents were examined rapidly on the first day and numbers chalked on those stated to be work material by FrJ. FRIEDRICHS and Dr. ROHRBACH. Only a few of the files were opened at this time.

In succeeding days the files in the cellar were taken up systematically to a guarded room upstairs and there examined. Only those files were excluded which contained material of an entirely personal nature and hardly likely to relate to work, such as clothing, food, rugs, etc. After the first few these were not ransacked. Files containing personal letters and books were looked at more thoroughly, and in some cases personal documents, especially if administrative, and personal books, especially if related to linguistics, were removed to another file and noted. The problem of selection in such cases is not any easy one, and it is possible that mistakes were made. However, it was noted that with the one exception of the files of BRANDES there was never any mixing of personal and work documents other than reference works and dictionaries. On the evidence of Herr PASCHKE'S effects as found at Zschepplin it appears likely that the files containing personal effects were actually kept in private dwellings and not in the office at all.

There were no keys for two sets of locks, and these had to be broken. The contents were transferred intact, except as noted, if found of interest, to an empty or personal file with a good lock.

In a few cases, specifically the files of PASCHKE, FrJ. SCHRADER and Dr. KARSTIEN and the files located in the large work room, the file was opened in the presence of the person to whom it belonged. If it contained work material this was described, leading to a considerable saving of time.

In a few cases a file contained only small items of potential value and these were removed and placed in another file and a note made in the blue register. No single document was altered or partially removed.

In the end the process of selection narrowed down the files deemed essential to 73, and these, plus the 5 crates, constitute the first shipment.

Priorities After the necessarily hasty examination of all files it appeared that there were none of such immediate vital interest as to deserve special handling at once or an attempt to evaluate the contents if delayed.

Two priorities were assigned, A and B. In the case of Pers Z.S. documents containing cryptographic work this was based on a rough balance of skill apparent, importance of the country so far as known, and recent date. More difficulty was experienced in grading the Pers Z. files, non-cryptographic but geheim and looking potentially valuable, and many of these were given an A. The packing crates were all given A as three contained onetime pads, and it was thought that all should be handled together. It was thought that the files would be shipped at once in any case.

Records In the ~~first hasty~~ examination some files were given chalk numbers, and these numbers are the basis of the list in the first blue notebook. The use of chalk was unfortunate, for when the files were moved upstairs systematically some of the chalk numbers rubbed off, and new numbers, in sticky paper labels, were given to some cabinets, leading to blank numbers in the original series derived from the chalk numbers.

The blue notebooks were the first systematic record and were intended to cover every file. However, in the end many empty files in the cellar were omitted from the total, and some of these were in fact substituted for original files which had been jimmied. (Notes being made in the blue notebook when this was done).

After the documents for shipment had been selected a second and somewhat briefer register was compiled in the form of index cards, one per file, to accompany the files in whatever manner they were shipped and to be used by couriers in checking them. These index cards were carefully checked with the blue notebooks. In a few cases there is added information on them so that one should not be used to the exclusion of the other.

Sealing and Shipping. The question was raised of sealing all files with references to American or British work. As there seemed no sure way of using sealing wax and as there were no facilities for baling the files with wire, it was finally decided not to do this. It was felt that the fact that the files were of steel and locked, and would be handled under direct supervision at all stages in fairly small quantities, provided sufficient security. The nine files which might have been so sealed have been so noted on their index cards, and a special watch kept on them in loading and shipping.

All the files were removed from their guarded rooms at the Burg directly to waiting vans, with no waiting and no lying around, and under officer supervision at all points. The same handling is expected at the air field and in unloading.

Summary It is believed that this first shipment contains every document of direct cryptographic interest, and every document that seemed in the slightest degree likely to have indirect cryptographic or administrative interest. In other words these files are thought to contain all the original work of these people, all the collateral material used in the work, and all the documents produced by them having any possible intelligence bearing -- down to and including the air raid rosters! The question asked was not "Is it important?" but "Does it relate in any way to the work or to the organisation?".

6) REMOVAL OF HOLLERITH EQUIPMENT--

1. At the time the equipment was abandoned by the Germans it was apparently being moved to its first operational location, as the machines had never been used. The machines had been rendered inoperative but had not been destroyed. Most of the machine wiring had been cut, and all easily removable parts, blue prints, diagrams, etc., had been removed. No punched cards were found; a few blank cards were found but there was no card form printed on them.

2. This is a detailed list of the equipment found:

- ✓ 4 Alphabetic-numeric key punches. These machines were of standard German design, with pluggable skip and ejection. Both alphabetic and numeric keyboards were wired for standard punching.
- 1 Card counting sorter. Regular horizontal sorter equipped with 15 veeder counters for recording the card count of each punch position, reject count, and minor and grand totals.
- 1 Sorter with Multiple Column Selector. Regular horizontal sorter equipped with mechanical type multiple column selector designed to select any pre-determined punched combination within ten adjacent card columns. This selector was badly damaged and some of the parts removed so that it was impossible to ascertain whether it had any special features.
- ✓ 1 Collator. Standard machine, manufactured by Compagnie Electro Comptable of France. Machine was not equipped with a counting device.
- ✓ 2 Reproducers. Standard machines, of German design, one equipped with summary punching. However, the cable plugboard would not fit the receptacle in the tabulator.
- ✓ 1 Multiplier. Standard German design, equipped with six banks of counters.
- ✓ 1 Alphabetic tabulator. Standard American machine manufactured before 1937. Equipped with 80 counters and an automatic carriage of apparently Italian manufacture. No special features.

3. As many of the relay assemblies, plugboards, counters and parts were removed as was possible in the time available. Two of the key punches were taken, and also all removable machine covers that had the organizational designation painted on them. The rest of the equipment was destroyed using dynamite and thermite bombs.

4. Detailed study of the machines and parts had not revealed any special features. The conclusion is that the machines were to be used for standard statistical work.

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7) REPORT ON SECURITY MEASURES.

a) Against the Germans.

From the first it appeared hopeless to prevent other Germans connected with the organisation from finding out about the exploitation of both Burg and Zscheppelin. That the units were located at these places was known both to other people in the work (of whom one, Dr. LEHMANN, had left Burg a week before the guard was posted) and to relatives and friends of the members of the units. Later inquiries are almost inevitable, and any of the unrelated persons remaining both at Burg and at Zscheppelin could supply enough hints to make the entire picture perfectly clear.

A more concrete problem was that of preventing the personnel who were detained from finding out much about Allied Signal Intelligence organization and scope. Unfortunately the ground had been out from under our feet on this by the nature of both Lt. FENN's and Col. CLEAVES' conversations with the Germans before the arrival of the team. It had been made clear to the Germans that a group of their opposite numbers were arriving to handle them, and Col. CLEAVES made this very statement in introducing all the officers of the team by name on the first day.

From that point on the members of the team adopted aliases and did their utmost to impress the fake names on the Germans. This proved a difficult front to maintain, with the many articles bearing true names and with blunders into the bargain, and it is likely that the Germans knew our right names at all times and were probably deriving a little quiet amusement from the attempt to conceal them.

The team was more successful in concealing the nature of the cryptanalytic work in which its members were engaged. Both in interrogation and in the examination of documents technical matters were avoided entirely. The priorities given to particular files were carefully concealed, and there was no hint of what the team considered important in its exploitation.

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In addition complete security measures were taken for all notes and files compiled by the team itself. The original members of the team occupied two adjoining rooms. One of these was entered daily by a cleaning woman, and at this time all papers were removed from it or an officer sat in the room. The other room was used only by the team and contained the main team files at all times when work was not in progress. Both rooms were locked at all times when not in use. Moreover the nature of the ground plan of the house was an aid to security, as the guard, drivers, etc. were in the third room on the same row and were passing by the team's doors at all hours, while the German Foreign Office personnel were in another wing entirely and the only Germans regularly in this wing were the kitchen and cleaning staff of the Graf.

It may be queried why the house was not emptied of both the Foreign Office personnel and the 40-odd relatives and servants of the Graf who remained there throughout the exploitation. The answer is, that the cards were already on the table when the team arrived. All the Foreign Office personnel knew that they were going to hand over all files, and if they were in good faith on this the rest was incidental, with a guard present and proper security of the work of the team. The Graf's household was composed entirely of women and children, except for three old men and one effeminate middle aged one. The Foreign Office stated that they had always kept the nature of their work a complete secret from the household, but even if this had not been so it appeared incontestable that the members of the household could have done what harm they chose before the arrival of the team. If they were moved out of the Burg they could still get a clear idea of the team's activities by watching movements through the village. As with the Foreign Office personnel the guard and the elementary security measures taken appeared sufficient to prevent any interruption of the work of the team. An additional reason, in retrospect, is that to have taken over the Burg would have been to cause even wider publicity and possibly to bring the exploitation to the notice of the Russians when

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ainst the Russians.

+Although aware that the Burg lay in an eventual Russian area, the team was at first so occupied with the job of intelligence gathering that it did not give full consideration to the necessity of screening the pinch from the Russians. When the matter was first raised by higher authority the team's reaction was that it was impossible to screen, so full had been the publicity surrounding the exploitation.

After much thrashing, however, a basic security formula was evolved and action taken accordingly. This formula was that if the Russians got on the trail at all no security measures could prevent an alert intelligence service from finding out what had taken place. What was required, then, was that the obvious evidences should be removed or so far reduced that they would be removed by the Russian infantry in its first occupation.

Action along these lines was concerned with two elements, personnel and material which bore the imprint of the unit or might be considered so peculiar as to call for investigation.

In the case of personnel that action taken was to evacuate almost all civilians in both Zschepplin and the Burg to Marburg in the American area. This included not only members of the unit but relatives, especially of those evacuated to England. A full list of the German personnel encountered is given in Appendix B, with disposition of each, and an examination of this list will show that only a handful of ladies, mostly old and some sick were left at Zschepplin, and none at all at the Burg. The standard used was a rough and ready one to some extent; wives were taken but the mistress of one of those evacuated to England was left in Zschepplin. In the end it was felt that the persons left at Zschepplin were few and ordinary enough not to rouse suspicion, especially as most of them were working in the military hospital there as attendants.